Famous for helping build Apple’s iPhones, Foxconn just suffered another cyberattack, highlighting the perils of warehousing some of the world’s most valuable data.
Iran’s traditional naval fleet has been almost completely destroyed by US-Israeli raids. But Iran’s military has put a fleet of small vessels on the water that is crippling every passageway.
Google has identified the first zero-day exploit it believes was developed with artificial intelligence. The criminal threat actor that built it planned to use it in a mass exploitation event. Google’s Threat Intelligence Group discovered the vulnera…
Any development environment that installed or imported one of the 172 compromised npm or PyPI packages published since May 11 should be treated as potentially compromised. On affected developer workstations, the worm harvests credentials from over 100 file paths: AWS keys, SSH private keys, npm tokens, GitHub PATs, HashiCorp Vault tokens, Kubernetes service accounts, Docker configs, shell history, and cryptocurrency wallets. For the first time in a TeamPCP campaign, it targets password managers including 1Password and Bitwarden, according to SecurityWeek.
It steals Claude and Kiro AI agent configurations, including MCP server auth tokens for every external service an agent connects to. And it does not leave when the package is removed.
The worm installs persistence in Claude Code (.claude/settings.json) and VS Code (.vscode/tasks.json with runOn: folderOpen) that re-execute every project open, plus a system daemon (macOS LaunchAgent / Linux systemd) that survives reboots. These live in the project tree, not in node_modules. Uninstalling the package does not remove them. On CI runners, the worm reads runner process memory directly via /proc/pid/mem to extract secrets, including masked ones, on Linux-based runners. If you revoke tokens before isolating the machine, Wiz’s analysis found a destructive daemon wipes your home directory.
Between 19:20 and 19:26 UTC on May 11, the Mini Shai-Hulud worm published 84 malicious versions across 42 @tanstack/* npm packages. Within 48 hours the campaign expanded to 172 packages across 403 malicious versions spanning npm and PyPI, according to Mend’s tracking. @tanstack/react-router alone receives 12.7 million weekly downloads. CVE-2026-45321, CVSS 9.6. OX Security reported 518 million cumulative downloads affected. Every malicious version carried a valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestation. The provenance was real. The packages were poisoned.
“TanStack had the right setup on paper: OIDC trusted publishing, signed provenance, 2FA on every maintainer account. The attack worked anyway,” Peyton Kennedy, senior security researcher at Endor Labs, told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview. “What the orphaned commit technique shows is that OIDC scope is the actual control that matters here, not provenance, not 2FA. If your publish pipeline trusts the entire repository rather than a specific workflow on a specific branch, a commit with no parent history and no branch association is enough to get a valid publish token. That’s a one-line configuration fix.”
Three vulnerabilities chained into one provenance-attested worm
TanStack’s postmortem lays out the kill chain. On May 10, the attacker forked TanStack/router under the name zblgg/configuration, chosen to avoid fork-list searches per Snyk’s analysis. A pull request triggered a pull_request_target workflow that checked out fork code and ran a build, giving the attacker code execution on TanStack’s runner. The attacker poisoned the GitHub Actions cache. When a legitimate maintainer merged to main, the release workflow restored the poisoned cache. Attacker binaries read /proc/pid/mem, extracted the OIDC token, and POSTed directly to registry.npmjs.org. Tests failed. Publish was skipped. 84 signed packages still reached the registry.
“Each vulnerability bridges the trust boundary the others assumed,” the postmortem states. Published tradecraft from the March 2025 tj-actions/changed-files compromise, recombined in a new context.
The worm crossed from npm into PyPI within hours
Microsoft Threat Intelligence confirmed the mistralai PyPI package v2.4.6 executes on import (not on install), downloading a payload disguised as Hugging Face Transformers. npm mitigations (lockfile enforcement, –ignore-scripts) do not cover Python import-time execution.
Mistral AI published a security advisory confirming the impact. Compromised npm packages were available between May 11 at 22:45 UTC and May 12 at 01:53 UTC (roughly three hours). The PyPI release mistralai==2.4.6 is quarantined. Mistral stated an affected developer device was involved but no Mistral infrastructure was compromised. SafeDep confirmed Mistral never released v2.4.6; no commits landed May 11 and no tag exists.
Wiz documented the full blast radius: 65 UiPath packages, Mistral AI SDKs, OpenSearch, Guardrails AI, 20 Squawk packages. StepSecurity attributes the campaign to TeamPCP, based on toolchain overlap with prior Shai-Hulud waves and the Bitwarden CLI/Trivy compromises. The worm runs under Bun rather than Node.js to evade Node.js security monitoring.
The attacker treated AI coding agents as part of the trusted execution environment
Socket’s technical analysis of the 2.3 MB router_init.js payload identifies ten credential-collection classes running in parallel. The worm writes persistence into .claude/ and .vscode/ directories, hooking Claude Code’s SessionStart config and VS Code’s folder-open task runner. StepSecurity’s deobfuscation confirmed the worm also harvests Claude and Kiro MCP server configurations (~/.claude.json, ~/.claude/mcp.json, ~/.kiro/settings/mcp.json), which store API keys and auth tokens for external services. This is an early but confirmed instance of supply-chain malware treating AI agent configurations as high-value credential targets. The npm token description the worm sets reads: “IfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner.” It is not a bluff.
“What stood out to me about this payload is where it planted itself after running,” Kennedy told VentureBeat. “It wrote persistence hooks into Claude Code’s SessionStart config and VS Code’s folder-open task runner so it would re-execute every time a developer opened a project, even after the npm package was removed. The attacker treated the AI coding agent as part of the trusted execution environment, which it is. These tools read your repo, run shell commands, and have access to the same secrets a developer does. Securing a development environment now means thinking about the agents, not just the packages.”
CI/CD Trust-Chain Audit Grid
Six gaps Mini Shai-Hulud exploited. What your CI/CD does today. The control that closes each one.
|
Audit question |
What your CI/CD does today |
The gap |
|
1. Pin OIDC trusted publishing to a specific workflow file on a specific protected branch. Constrain id-token: write to only the publish job. Ensure that job runs from a clean workspace with no restored untrusted cache |
Most orgs grant OIDC trust at the repository level. Any workflow run in the repo can request a publish token. id-token: write is often set at the workflow level, not scoped to the publish job. |
The worm achieved code execution inside the legitimate release workflow via cache poisoning, then extracted the OIDC token from runner process memory. Branch/workflow pinning alone would not have stopped this attack because the malicious code was already running inside the pinned workflow. The complete fix requires pinning PLUS constraining id-token: write to only the publish job PLUS ensuring that job uses a clean, unshared cache. |
|
2. Treat SLSA provenance as necessary but not sufficient. Add behavioral analysis at install time |
Teams treat a valid Sigstore provenance badge as proof a package is safe. npm audit signatures passes. The badge is green. Procurement and compliance workflows accept provenance as a gate. |
All 84 malicious TanStack versions carry valid SLSA Build Level 3 provenance attestations. First widely reported npm worm with validly-attested packages. Provenance attests where a package was built, not whether the build was authorized. Socket’s AI scanner flagged all 84 artifacts within six minutes of publication. Provenance flagged zero. |
|
3. Isolate GitHub Actions cache per trust boundary. Invalidate caches after suspicious PRs. Never check out and execute fork code in pull_request_target workflows |
Fork-triggered workflows and release workflows share the same cache namespace. Closing or reverting a malicious PR is treated as restoring clean state. pull_request_target is widely used for benchmarking and bundle-size analysis with fork PR checkout. |
Attacker poisoned pnpm store via fork-triggered pull_request_target that checked out and executed fork code on the base runner. Cache survived PR closure. The next legitimate release workflow restored the poisoned cache on merge. actions/cache@v5 uses a runner-internal token for cache saves, not the workflow’s GITHUB_TOKEN, so permissions: contents: read does not prevent mutation. Kennedy: ‘Branch protection rules don’t apply to commits that aren’t on any branch, so that whole layer of hardening didn’t help.’ |
|
4. Audit optionalDependencies in lockfiles and dependency graphs. Block github: refs pointing to non-release commits |
Static analysis and lockfile enforcement focus on dependencies and devDependencies. optionalDependencies with github: commit refs are not flagged by most tools. |
The worm injected optionalDependencies pointing to a github: orphan commit in the attacker’s fork. When npm resolves a github: dependency, it clones the referenced commit and runs lifecycle hooks (including prepare) automatically. The payload executed before the main package’s own install step completed. SafeDep confirmed Mistral never released v2.4.6; no commits landed and no tag exists. |
|
5. Audit Python dependency imports separately from npm controls. Cover AI/ML pipelines consuming guardrails-ai, mistralai, or any compromised PyPI package |
npm mitigations (lockfile enforcement, –ignore-scripts) are applied to the JavaScript stack. Python packages are assumed safe if pip install completes. AI/ML CI pipelines are treated as internal testing infrastructure, not as supply-chain attack targets. |
Microsoft Threat Intelligence confirmed mistralai PyPI v2.4.6 executes on import, not install. Injected code in __init__.py downloads a payload disguised as Hugging Face Transformers. –ignore-scripts is irrelevant for Python import-time execution. guardrails-ai@0.10.1 also executes on import. Any agentic repo with GitHub Actions id-token: write is exposed to the same OIDC extraction technique. LLM API keys, vector DB credentials, and external service tokens all in the blast radius. |
|
6. Isolate and image affected machines before revoking stolen tokens. Do not revoke npm tokens until the host is forensically preserved |
Standard incident response: revoke compromised tokens first, then investigate. npm token list and immediate revocation is the instinctive first step. |
The worm installs a persistent daemon (macOS LaunchAgent / Linux systemd) that polls GitHub every 60 seconds. On detecting token revocation (40X error), it triggers rm -rf ~/, wiping the home directory. The npm token description reads: ‘IfYouRevokeThisTokenItWillWipeTheComputerOfTheOwner.’ Microsoft reported geofenced destructive behavior: a 1-in-6 chance of rm -rf / on systems appearing to be in Israel or Iran. Kennedy: ‘Even after the package is gone, the payload may still be sitting in .claude/ with a SessionStart hook pointing at it. rm -rf node_modules doesn’t remove it.’ |
Sources: TanStack postmortem, StepSecurity, Socket, Snyk, Wiz, Microsoft Threat Intelligence, Mend, Endor Labs. May 12, 2026.
Security director action plan
-
Today: “The fastest check is find . -name ‘router_init.js’ -size +1M and grep -r ’79ac49eedf774dd4b0cfa308722bc463cfe5885c’ package-lock.json,” Kennedy said. If either returns a hit, isolate and image the machine immediately. Do not revoke tokens until the host is forensically preserved. The worm’s destructive daemon triggers on revocation. Once the machine is isolated, rotate credentials in this order: npm tokens first, then GitHub PATs, then cloud keys. Hunt for .claude/settings.json and .vscode/tasks.json persistence artifacts across every project that was open on the affected machine.
-
This week: Rotate every credential accessible from affected hosts: npm tokens, GitHub PATs, AWS keys, Vault tokens, K8s service accounts, SSH keys. Check your packages for unexpected versions after May 11 with commits by claude@users.noreply.github.com. Block filev2.getsession[.]org and git-tanstack[.]com.
-
This month: Audit every GitHub Actions workflow against the six gaps above. Pin OIDC publishing to specific workflows on protected branches. Isolate cache keys per trust boundary. Set npm config set min-release-age=7d. For AI/ML teams: check guardrails-ai and mistralai against compromised versions, audit CI pipelines for id-token: write exposure, and rotate every LLM API key and vector DB credential accessible from CI.
-
This quarter (board-level): Fund behavioral analysis at the package registry layer. Provenance verification alone is no longer a sufficient procurement criterion for supply-chain security tooling. Require CI/CD security audits as part of vendor risk assessments for any tool with publish access to your registries. Establish a policy that no workflow with id-token: write runs from a shared cache. Treat AI coding agent configurations (.claude/, .kiro/, .vscode/) as credential stores subject to the same access controls as cloud key vaults.
The worm is iterating. Defenders must, as well
This is the fifth Shai-Hulud wave in eight months. Four SAP packages became 84 TanStack packages in two weeks. intercom-client@7.0.4 fell 29 hours later, confirming active propagation through stolen CI/CD infrastructure. Late on May 12, malware research collective vx-underground reported that the fully weaponized Shai-Hulud worm code has been open-sourced. If confirmed, this means the attack is no longer limited to TeamPCP. Any threat actor can now deploy the same cache-poisoning, OIDC-extraction, and provenance-attested publishing chain against any npm or PyPI package with a misconfigured CI/CD pipeline.
“We’ve been tracking this campaign family since September 2025,” Kennedy said. “Each wave has picked a higher-download target and introduced a more technically interesting access vector. The orphaned commit technique here is genuinely novel. Branch protection rules don’t apply to commits that aren’t on any branch. The supply chain security space has spent a lot of energy on provenance and trusted publishing over the last two years. This attack walked straight through both of those controls because the gap wasn’t in the signing. It was in the scope.”
Provenance tells you where a package was built. It does not tell you whether the build was authorized. That is the gap this audit is designed to close.
A fake TikTok app is actually a banking trojan enabling credential theft and wire fraud.
Fake Claude support pages are circulating, being advertised through Google Ads
Intrusion Logging is a new part of Android’s Advanced Protection Mode, which aims to help protect human rights activists, journalists, and dissidents from government spyware attack and law enforcement forensic devices.
The bank said the security lapse was due to the use of an “unauthorized” AI software app.
Between May 6 and 7, four security research teams published findings about Anthropic’s Claude that most outlets covered as three separate stories. One involved a water utility in Mexico, another targeted a Chrome extension, and a third hijacked OAuth tokens through Claude Code. In one case, Claude identified a water utility’s SCADA gateway without being told to look for one.
These are not three bugs. They are one architectural question playing out on three surfaces. No single patch released so far addresses all of them.
The common thread is the confused deputy, a trust-boundary failure where a program with legitimate authority executes actions on behalf of the wrong principal. In each case, Claude held real capabilities on every surface and handed them to whoever showed up. An attacker probing a water utility’s network. A Chrome extension with zero permissions. A malicious npm package rewriting a config file.
Carter Rees, VP of Artificial Intelligence at Reputation, identified the structural reason this class of failure is so dangerous. The flat authorization plane of an LLM fails to respect user permissions, Rees told VentureBeat in an exclusive interview. An agent operating on that flat plane does not need to escalate privileges, it already has them.
Kayne McGladrey, an IEEE senior member who advises enterprises on identity risk, described the same dynamic independently in an interview with VentureBeat. Enterprises are cloning human permission sets onto agentic systems, McGladrey said. The agent does whatever it needs to do to get its job done, and sometimes that means using far more permissions than a human would.
Dragos found Claude targeting a water utility’s SCADA gateway without being told to look for one
Dragos published its analysis on May 6. Between December 2025 and February 2026, an unidentified adversary compromised multiple Mexican government organizations. In January 2026, the campaign reached Servicios de Agua y Drenaje de Monterrey, the municipal water and drainage utility serving the Monterrey metropolitan area.
Dragos analyzed more than 350 artifacts. The adversary used Claude as the primary technical executor and OpenAI’s GPT models for data processing. Claude wrote a 17,000-line Python framework containing 49 modules for network discovery, credential harvesting, privilege escalation, and lateral movement. Claude compressed what would traditionally take days or weeks of tooling development into hours, according to the Dragos analysis.
Without any prior ICS/OT context, Claude identified a server running a vNode SCADA/IIoT management interface, classified the platform as high-value, generated credential lists, and launched an automated password spray. The attack failed, and no OT breach occurred, but Claude did the targeting. Dragos noted that this was not a product vulnerability in the traditional sense because Claude performed exactly as designed. The architectural gap, as the firm described it, is that the model cannot distinguish an authorized developer from an adversary using the same interface.
Jay Deen, associate principal adversary hunter at Dragos, wrote that the investigation showed how commercial AI tools have made OT more visible to adversaries already operating within IT.
CrowdStrike CTO Elia Zaitsev told VentureBeat why this class of incident evades detection. Nothing bad has happened until the agent acts, Zaitsev said. It is almost always at the action layer. The Monterrey reconnaissance looked like a developer querying internal systems. The developer tool just had an adversary at the keyboard.
Stack blind spot: OT monitoring does not flag AI-generated recon from IT-side developer tools. EDR sees the process but has no visibility into intent.
LayerX proved any Chrome extension can hijack Claude through a trust boundary Anthropic partially patched
On May 7, LayerX researcher Aviad Gispan disclosed ClaudeBleed. Claude in Chrome uses Chrome’s externally connectable feature to allow communication with scripts on the claude.ai origin, but does not verify whether those scripts came from Anthropic or were injected by another extension. Any Chrome extension can inject commands into Claude’s messaging interface. Zero permissions required.
LayerX reported the flaw on April 27. Anthropic shipped version 1.0.70 on May 6. LayerX found that the patch did not remove the vulnerable handler. LayerX bypassed the new protections through the side-panel initialization flow and by switching Claude into “Act without asking” mode, which required no user notification. Anthropic’s patch survived less than a day.
Mike Riemer, SVP of Network Security Group and Field CISO at Ivanti, told VentureBeat that threat actors are now reverse engineering patches within 72 hours using AI assistance. If a vendor releases a patch and the customer has not applied it within that window, the vulnerability is already being exploited, Riemer said. Anthropic’s ClaudeBleed patch did not survive even a third of that window.
Stack blind spot: EDR watches files and processes but does not monitor extension-to-extension messaging within the browser. ClaudeBleed produces no file writes, no network anomalies, and no process spawns.
Mitiga showed a config file rewrite steals OAuth tokens and survives rotation
Also on May 7, Mitiga Labs researcher Idan Cohen published a man-in-the-middle attack chain targeting Claude Code. Claude Code stores MCP configuration and OAuth tokens in ~/.claude.json, a single user-writable file. A malicious npm postinstall hook can rewrite the MCP server URL to route traffic through an attacker’s proxy, capturing OAuth tokens for Jira, Confluence, and GitHub. Because the postinstall hook fires on every Claude Code load, it reasserts the malicious endpoint even after token rotation — meaning the standard incident response step of rotating credentials does not break the attack chain unless the hook itself is removed first.
Mitiga reported the finding on April 10. On April 12, Anthropic classified it as out of scope, according to Mitiga’s published disclosure.
Riemer described the principle this chain violates. I do not know you until I validate you, Riemer told VentureBeat. Until I know what it is and I know who is on the other side of the keyboard, I am not going to communicate with it. The ~/.claude.json rewrite substitutes the attacker’s endpoint for the legitimate one. Claude Code never re-validates.
Riemer has spent 21 years architecting the product he now leads and holds five patents on its security infrastructure. He applies the same defensive logic he built into his own platform. If a threat actor gets in, drop all connections. That is a fail-safe design. Anthropic’s architecture does the opposite. It fails open.
Stack blind spot: Web application firewalls never see local config rewrites. EDR treats JSON file writes as normal developer behavior. Rotating tokens does not break the chain unless responders also confirm the hook is removed.
Anthropic’s response pattern treats the user’s trust decision as the security boundary
Anthropic classified Mitiga’s MCP token theft as out of scope on April 12. The company called OX Security’s STDIO vulnerability affecting an estimated 200,000 MCP servers “expected” and by design. Anthropic declined Adversa AI’s TrustFall as outside its threat model, according to Adversa’s published disclosure. ClaudeBleed was partially patched. Across all four disclosures, the researchers say the underlying trust model remains exploitable.
Alex Polyakov, co-founder of Adversa AI, told The Register that each vulnerability gets patched in isolation, but the underlying class has not been fixed.
Zaitsev offered a frame for why consent alone cannot serve as the trust boundary. If you think you can always understand intent, Zaitsev told VentureBeat, then you would also think it is possible to write a program that reads a text transcript and figures out if someone is lying. That is intuitively an impossible problem to solve.
Adversa AI showed that a cloned repo can auto-execute arbitrary code the moment a developer clicks trust
Adversa AI researcher Alex Polyakov published TrustFall, demonstrating that project-scoped Claude configuration files in a cloned repository can silently authorize MCP servers to run as native OS processes with full user privileges. The moment a developer clicks the generic “Yes, I trust this folder” dialog, any MCP server defined in the project config launches. The dialog does not show what it authorizes.
In automated build pipelines where Claude Code runs without a screen, the trust dialog never appears. The attack executes with zero human interaction. Adversa confirmed the pattern is not unique to Claude Code. All four major coding agents (Claude Code, Cursor, Gemini CLI, and GitHub Copilot) can auto-execute project-defined MCP servers the moment a developer accepts that dialog.
Stack blind spot: No current security tooling can tell the difference between a legitimate project config and a malicious one. The trust dialog is the only thing standing between the developer and arbitrary code execution, and it does not show what it is about to authorize.
The matrix below maps each surface that Claude wrongly trusted, the stack blind spot, the detection signal, and the recommended action.
Claude Confused Deputy Audit Matrix
|
Surface |
Who Claude Trusted |
Why Your Stack Misses It |
Detection Signal |
Recommended Action |
|
claude.ai / API Dragos, May 6 350+ artifacts analyzed
|
Attacker posing as an authorized user via Claude’s prompt interface. Claude cannot distinguish a developer mapping internal systems from an adversary doing the same thing through the same interface. |
OT monitoring watches ICS protocols and anomalous traffic patterns. AI-generated recon originates from an IT-side developer tool, not from the OT network. The queries look identical to legitimate developer activity because they ARE legitimate developer activity with an adversary at the keyboard. |
Query: Claude API logs for requests referencing internal hostnames, IP ranges, or SCADA/ICS keywords. Alert trigger: >5 credential generation requests against internal services in 60 minutes. Escalation: OT team notified on any AI-originated query touching vNode, SCADA, HMI, or PLC keywords. |
Segment AI-assisted sessions from OT-adjacent network segments. Log all Claude API calls referencing internal hostnames or IP ranges. Alert on automated credential generation targeting internal authentication interfaces. Require explicit OT authorization for any AI tool with internal network access. |
|
Claude in Chrome LayerX, May 7 v1.0.70 patch bypassed <24hrs |
Any script running in the claude.ai browser context, including scripts injected by zero-permission extensions. The externally connectable manifest trusts the origin (claude.ai), not the execution context. Any extension can inject into that origin. |
EDR monitors file system activity, process execution, and network connections. Extension-to-extension messaging happens entirely within the browser runtime. No file writes. No network anomalies. No process spawns. EDR has zero visibility into Chrome’s internal messaging API. |
Query: Chrome extension inventory for any extension with content scripts targeting claude.ai in the manifest. Alert trigger: New extension installed with claude.ai in permissions or content script targets. Escalation: Browser security team reviews any extension communicating with Claude’s messaging interface. |
Audit Chrome extensions across the fleet for claude.ai content script access. Disable “Act without asking” mode in Claude in Chrome enterprise-wide. Deploy browser security tooling that inspects extension messaging channels. Monitor for extensions injecting content scripts into claude.ai domain. |
|
Claude Code MCP Mitiga, May 7 Anthropic: “out of scope” April 12 |
Rewritten ~/.claude.json routing MCP traffic through attacker-controlled proxy. Claude Code reads the MCP server URL from the config file on every load. It never re-validates that the URL matches the endpoint the user originally authorized. |
WAF inspects HTTP traffic between clients and servers. It never sees a local config file rewrite. EDR treats JSON file writes in the user’s home directory as normal developer behavior. Token rotation feeds the chain because the npm postinstall hook reasserts the malicious URL on every Claude Code load. |
Query: File integrity monitor on ~/.claude.json for MCP server URL changes. Alert trigger: MCP server URL changed to endpoint not on approved allowlist. Escalation: IR team confirms postinstall hook removal before closing ticket. Token rotation alone is insufficient. |
Monitor ~/.claude.json for unexpected MCP endpoint changes against an allowlist. Block or alert on npm postinstall hooks that modify files outside the package directory. Maintain a centralized MCP server URL allowlist. Do NOT assume token rotation breaks the chain without confirming the malicious hook is removed first. |
|
Claude Code project settings Adversa AI, May 7 Affects Claude, Cursor, Gemini CLI, Copilot |
Project-scoped .claude configuration file in a cloned repository. Clicking the generic “Yes, I trust this folder” dialog silently authorizes any MCP server defined in the project config. The dialog does not show what it authorizes. |
No current security tooling can tell the difference between a legitimate project config and a malicious one. In automated build pipelines, Claude Code runs without a screen. The attack executes with zero human interaction against pull-request branches. |
Query: Pre-clone scan for .claude, .claude.json, .mcp.json, CLAUDE.md files in repository root. Alert trigger: Repo contains MCP server definition not on approved organizational list. Escalation: DevSecOps reviews before any developer opens the repo in Claude Code or any coding agent. |
Scan cloned repositories for .claude configuration files before opening in any AI coding agent. Require explicit per-server MCP approval rather than blanket folder trust. Flag repos that define custom MCP servers in project configuration. Audit CI/CD pipelines running Claude Code headless where trust dialogs are skipped entirely. |
The deputy changed
Norm Hardy described the confused deputy in 1988. The deputy he had in mind was a compiler. This one writes 17,000-line exploitation frameworks, identifies SCADA gateways on its own, and holds OAuth tokens to Jira, Confluence, and GitHub. Four research teams found the same failure class on four surfaces in the same week. Anthropic’s response to each one was some version of “the user consented.” The matrix above is the audit Anthropic has not built. If your team runs Claude Code or Claude in Chrome, start there.
The round valued the three-year-old startup at $725 million.