Western financial aid—€170 billion ($189.5 billion) since 2022—has been key to helping Kyiv stay financially afloat since Russia's wider invasion, according to the Kiel Institute. But the U.S. has drastically cut aid under the second Trump administration, leaving the European Union, Canada, Japan, Norway, and the United Kingdom to shoulder most of the burden. 

Earlier this year, the EU approved a plan to lend Ukraine €90 billion to Ukraine through 2027, two-thirds of which will go to buy weapons and the rest to budgetary support. Around €14 billion has been disbursed to date, and by year's end that figure should grow to €45 billion.

But Russian attacks on critical infrastructure and other stresses mean that Kyiv is still looking at a budget deficit of around €70 billion for 2027. 

European governments are spending more on their own defenses. In 2021, the defense budgets of NATO's European members averaged around 1.6 percent of GDP, below NATO’s then-target of 2 percent. The alliance has since boosted its goal to 2.5 percent of GDP, and at last year's summit, committed to raising ‘core’ defense expenditure to 3.5 percent  over the next decade.

At the same time, they are facing rising debt and slowing economies. Eurozone countries have an average debt-to-GDP ratio of nearly 89 percent, and nearly 83 percent in EU nations generally. Buffeted by the trade wars and energy shocks of the Trump administration, eurozone economies will grow only 1.1 percent in 2026, according to a recent projection by the International Monetary Fund. Some northern EU members are in much better fiscal shape than their southern and western counterparts.

The budget picture is getting cloudier. Annual inflation in the eurozone rose to 3.8 percent in September, according to Eurostat, well above the European Central Bank (ECB) target of 2 percent. The ECB raised interest rates at its June and September meetings, and is expected to deliver another hike at one of the year's two remaining meetings. Rising prices may force the ECB to continue tightening policy, raising debt-service payments from government budgets. 

Supporting Ukraine remains broadly popular in the EU, but the challenging economic environment makes it a tough sell for governments to increase aid to Ukraine along with their own defense spending. European governments are already facing domestic criticism over rearmament. Italy, for example, was approved for an allocation of up to €14.9 billion from the E.U.’s Security Action for Europe (SAFE) loan facility, meant to aid rearmament. Yet Rome requested only about €8 billion from SAFE, as Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s government sparred with critics within her own coalition and in the opposition on financing more defense spending with debt. 

Frozen Russian assets

EU countries are thus once again looking at alternative methods of backstopping Ukraine’s budget. One of the most obvious options is the conversion of frozen Russian financial assets into a loan to Kyiv. 

After Russia's February 2022 invasion, the G7 froze Russian government securities held abroad. As much as $300 billion was impounded as a result and remains in limbo to this day, including about €210 billion held in the European financial system. 

While the principal has remained untouched, the EU has begun to use the interest income on those securities to help Ukraine, on the grounds that Russia, as aggressor, should pay for the damage caused to Ukraine. That has generated about €8 billion, of which €3.8 billion has been delivered to Ukraine, and €4.2 billion has been reserved to repay E.U. or G7 loans to Ukraine. 

In September, Germany and other E.U. members revived the topic of converting the Russian assets into a loan for Kyiv, POLITICO reported. Berlin views the step as a ‘win-win’ for the E.U., enabling the bloc to help Kyiv address its financial needs, while replacing some of the funds that would be reserved for Ukraine in the E.U.’s upcoming multi-year budget. 

But the politics around seizing the Russian assets have barely budged. 

Belgium is the custodian of much of those Russian funds, which are housed in the Brussels-based Euroclear. The Belgian government blocked a 2025 proposal to seize the funds, fearing that it alone would bear the legal and financial risk of seizing the funds. Earlier this year, the Bank of Russia sued Euroclear in a Russian court for the funds, arguing that they were illegally seized. The court backed the Russian central bank’s challenge in a ruling two months later, though it lacks jurisdiction to enforce the judgment. 

Concern over the legal risks means Brussels will likely stymie the proposal again. 

“I am certain that the European Commission will not make proposals to meet Ukraine’s financing needs through a new operation linked to Russian assets,” Belgian Prime Minister Bart de Wever told reporters on Oct. 21. “I am certain of that, because that is what was said.” 

As European leaders prepare for a November meeting to iron out next year's assistance to Ukraine, the EU is already pushing other partners to increase their contributions to Kyiv. 

The situation is becoming more urgent. Ukraine has largely exhausted its stockpile of interceptors, leaving its cities and energy grid vulnerable to Russian attack. The Ukrainian military intelligence agency HUR recently estimated that Russia can produce 10,000 long-range strike drones and decoys each month. Mounting damage increases Ukraine’s financial needs, as the country scrambles to keep the lights on.

The peace talks were led by the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the Malaysian Land Forces, which sought the advice of the 5th Security Force Assistance Brigade, the unit’s commander told Defense One.

“They asked our advisors, who were in the space of the land force headquarters, ‘Hey, what should we be thinking about? How can we effectively do this?,” said Col. Daniel Hodermarsky. “And we were reporting back to [U.S. Army Pacific] and leveraging experts from the higher headquarters to provide that advice to more rapidly enable them to to take the lead.”

At the same time, 5th SFAB had a team on the ground in Thailand.

“We didn't have anyone near the front or in the conflict, but we were able to say, "Hey, here's what we're seeing with the country team in Thailand,” Hodermarsky said.

But 5th SFAB—the Army’s only remaining train-advise-assist unit—didn’t just happen to be in the right place at the right time. The specialized unit, made up of experienced conventional troops who have already led a squad or platoon, and so on, has been regularly deploying to INDOPACOM to work with partner militaries since 2020.

“So we're able to give a bit more granular, real-time reporting back to the theater, and we're tied in directly with each country team, security cooperation office and defense attaché wherever we have adviser teams,” Hodermarsky said. “So we can get those liaise cells, those assessment cells, and say, ‘Hey, here's what we're granularly seeing, hearing. Here's what the partner is asking, or here's what they're talking about.”

The Army developed the SFAB concept in 2017, when training and advising the Afghan army had no end in sight and the service was anticipating expanding that mission beyond U.S. Central Command. The idea was that rather than rotating conventional infantry and other units as advisers, the service would cultivate specialized units for the mission. The 1st SFAB deployed in Afghanistan in 2018.

By May 2020, six SFABs had been established, each aligned to a different part of the world. They were staffed by volunteers coming off operational assignments, now experienced and theoretically qualified to train a partner unit.

Last year, Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth ordered most of the SFABs to be dissolved. The units assigned to European and Africa Commands have been shuttered, and their CENTCOM and National Guard counterparts will be gone by year’s end. 1st SFAB was reorganized as Army Security Cooperation Group-South in January. 

That leaves only Hodermarsky’s 5th, doing its part to keep the United States in the good graces of INDOPACOM countries that might otherwise align themselves with China’s growing military power. 

Some have argued that the moves are shortsighted.

“If the U.S. military continues marginalizing the advising mission or ignoring it altogether, then it means going back to the failed train-and-pray model,” argued a 2025 piece published by West Point’s Modern War Institute. “Fully staffed SFABs are not a luxury; they’re a necessity. Without them, the United States risks being flat-footed in the next war.” 

ASCG-S and 5th SFAB’s continued existence are an acknowledgement that the train-advise-assist mission is still important for the DOD’s top two priority regions.

5th’s farflung efforts

In INDOPACOM, 5th SFAB has been shaping militaries from Mongolia to the Philippines, embedding in their professional military academies as well as advising their senior leadership.

“We were in the Philippine Army headquarters and their [Training and Doctrine Command] equivalent for years, as they transitioned from a counterinsurgency focus across the Philippines, to a national-defense focus for their land forces” Hodermarsky said.

His unit’s relationships have also laid the groundwork for major exercises the Army now does in INDOPACOM, including Balikatan and Cobra Gold. 

“A persistent advisor team can stay in between the planning conferences and come up with the training plan, if we identify the partner unit that's going to exercise with the 25th Infantry Division or the the 7th Infantry Division,” Hodermarsky said. “And say, what are the training objectives for that Royal Thai Army unit or Philippine Army unit or Malaysian Land Force element? And then help them through that training progression.”

He said some division leaders call the SFAB the WD-40 of U.S. Army Pacific, because their teams ease friction between partner nations and conventional units visiting for exercises.

“We see sort of a reverse slope of advisor presence, as we hopefully work our way out of jobs in certain countries, so that you go from a partner force requesting more hands-on training and capability development through security force assistance, to where they're now really exercising as a flank unit or an integrated part of a U.S. division or brigade that is more capable, more trusted to be on our flank, or integrated into one of our major formations,” Hodermarsky said.