• XLoader remains one of the most challenging malware families confronting cybersecurity researchers.

    This sophisticated information-stealing loader emerged in 2020 as a rebrand of FormBook and has evolved into an increasingly complex threat.

    The malware’s code decrypts only at runtime and sits protected behind multiple encryption layers, each locked with different keys hidden throughout the binary.

    Even automated sandbox analysis tools struggle against XLoader’s aggressive evasion techniques that block malicious execution when virtual environments are detected.

    Check Point researchers identified a breakthrough approach to analyzing XLoader by leveraging generative artificial intelligence.

    The latest XLoader version 8.0 sample presented significant obstacles with customized encryption schemes, obfuscated API calls, and extensive sandbox evasion techniques.

    The malware authors release new versions regularly, changing internal mechanisms and adding anti-analysis methods that render previous research quickly outdated.

    The research demonstrated how ChatGPT accelerated static reverse engineering from days to hours.

    By exporting IDA Pro database contents and analyzing them through cloud-based artificial intelligence, researchers showed deep analysis could proceed without maintaining live disassembler sessions.

    Integration of an LLM with the reverse engineering environment through MCP (Source – CheckPoint)

    This approach removed dependency on heavy local tooling while making results reproducible and easier to share.

    Decrypting XLoader’s Built-in Protection

    XLoader version 8.0 implements sophisticated protection mechanisms through a built-in crypter that wraps the main payload in two rounds of RC4 encryption.

    The first layer applies RC4 decryption to the entire buffer, followed by a second pass processing 256-byte chunks using a different key.

    Each encryption round requires specific keys derived through complex algorithms scattered across multiple functions.

    Check Point analysts noted the main payload undergoes this dual-layer encryption scheme, with Stage-1 and Stage-2 keys calculated through separate derivation processes.

    The Stage-1 key (20EBC3439E2A201E6FC943EE95DACC6250A8A647) and Stage-2 key (86908CFE6813CB2E532949B6F4D7C6E6B00362EE) were successfully extracted through artificial intelligence-assisted analysis combined with runtime debugging validation.

    The complete unpacking process traditionally consuming days of manual reverse engineering, was compressed into approximately 40 minutes, offering defenders fresher indicators of compromise.

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    The post XLoader Malware Analyzed Using ChatGPT’s, Breaks RC4 Encryption Layers in Hours appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • The Tycoon 2FA phishing kit has emerged as one of the most sophisticated Phishing-as-a-Service platforms since its debut in August 2023, specifically engineered to circumvent two-factor authentication and multi-factor authentication protections on Microsoft 365 and Gmail accounts.

    This advanced threat employs an Adversary-in-the-Middle approach, utilizing reverse proxy servers to host convincing phishing pages that perfectly replicate legitimate login interfaces while capturing user credentials and session cookies in real-time.

    According to the Any.run malware trends tracker, Tycoon 2FA leads with over 64,000 reported incidents this year, making it one of the most prevalent phishing threats in the current landscape.

    The attack spreads through multiple distribution vectors including malicious PDF documents, SVG files, PowerPoint presentations, and emails containing phishing links.

    Threat actors have also leveraged cloud storage platforms such as Amazon S3 buckets, Canva, and Dropbox to host fake login pages, making detection more challenging for traditional security solutions.

    What makes this campaign particularly dangerous is its ability to steal authentication codes even when two-factor authentication is enabled, effectively rendering this security measure useless against the sophisticated interception techniques employed by the kit.

    Cybereason analysts identified that the phishing kit implements multiple pre-redirection checks as defense mechanisms against detection, including domain verification, CAPTCHA challenges, bot and scanning tool detection, and debugger checks that actively look for security researchers analyzing the code.

    These checks ensure that only genuine victims reach the final phishing page while automated security tools and analysts are redirected to benign websites.

    The kit also demonstrates an advanced understanding of organizational security policies by analyzing error messages from login attempts, allowing attackers to tailor their campaigns for maximum effectiveness.

    The technical sophistication extends to the use of boilerplate templates that dynamically generate fake login pages based on actual responses from Microsoft servers, creating a seamless experience that prompts users to input their MFA codes, which are then relayed to legitimate servers in real-time, successfully bypassing this critical security layer.

    Multi-Stage JavaScript Execution and Credential Harvesting

    The attack unfolds through a complex multi-stage JavaScript execution chain designed to evade detection while harvesting credentials.

    Attack chain (Source – Cybereason)

    The initial HTML page contains a JavaScript file with a base64-encoded payload compressed using the LZ-string algorithm, which decompresses and executes the hidden payload in memory.

    The second stage employs a technique called DOM Vanishing Act, where malicious JavaScript code removes itself from the Document Object Model after execution, leaving no visible trace for security tools inspecting the page code.

    The script contains three different base64-encoded payloads, each designed to run under specific conditions.

    The first payload uses XOR cipher obfuscation and executes only when window.location.pathname.split contains an exclamation mark or dollar sign, confirming that the user arrived via the intended malicious link rather than through automated scanning.

    Email extraction (Source – Cybereason)

    The email extraction process creates a custom string by appending “WQ” to the victim’s email address before exfiltrating it to the command-and-control server via POST request to /zcYbH5gqRHbzSQXiK8YtTbhpNSGtkZc6xbMyRBGazbWU8fjfq, where the server responds with AES-encrypted payloads decrypted using the CryptoJS library.

    When victims enter credentials into the fake login page, the attacker acting as a middleman immediately receives the information and submits it to legitimate Microsoft servers.

    The victim’s webpage is then dynamically updated based on server responses using webparts, making the phishing attempt appear seamless and highly convincing.

    The final JavaScript payload collects browser information including navigator.userAgent and sends requests to geolocation services, encrypting the gathered data with a hardcoded key before transmission to the attacker’s endpoint at /tdwsch3h8IoKcUOkog9d14CkjDcaR0ZrKSA95UaVbbMPZdxe, successfully completing the credential theft operation.

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    The post Attack Techniques of Tycoon 2FA Phishing Kit Targeting Microsoft 365 and Gmail Accounts Detailed appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • A sophisticated evolution of the RondoDox botnet has emerged with a staggering 650% increase in exploitation capabilities, marking a significant escalation in the threat landscape for both enterprise and IoT infrastructure.

    First documented by FortiGuard Labs in September 2024, the original RondoDox variant focused narrowly on DVR systems with just two exploit vectors.

    The newly discovered RondoDox v2, however, demonstrates a dramatic expansion with over 75 distinct exploitation vectors targeting everything from legacy routers to modern enterprise applications.

    This evolution represents a fundamental shift in botnet development strategy, bridging the gap between opportunistic IoT exploitation and targeted enterprise compromise.

    The malware was detected on October 30, 2025, through honeypot telemetry when research infrastructure began receiving automated exploitation attempts from IP address 124.198.131.83 originating from New Zealand.

    The attack pattern immediately distinguished itself through its volume and sophistication, deploying 75 distinct exploit payloads in rapid succession.

    Each payload attempted command injection vectors targeting router and IoT vulnerabilities, with all payloads downloading malicious scripts from the command-and-control server at 74.194.191.52.

    Unusually, the threat actor embedded an open attribution signature—bang2013@atomicmail.io—directly into User-Agent strings, marking a departure from the anonymous operational security typically employed by botnet operators.

    Beelzebub analysts identified the malware through their AI-native deception platform, which captured the complete attack chain and enabled comprehensive technical analysis of the botnet’s capabilities.

    RondoDox v2 targets an extensive range of vulnerable devices spanning multiple vendor ecosystems and spanning over a decade of CVE history.

    The exploit arsenal includes critical vulnerabilities such as CVE-2014-6271 (Shellshock), CVE-2018-10561 (Dasan GPON routers), CVE-2021-41773 (Apache HTTP Server), and CVE-2024-3721 (TBK DVR systems).

    The malware demonstrates cross-platform flexibility by deploying 16 architecture-specific binaries including x86_64, multiple ARM variants, MIPS, PowerPC, and even legacy architectures like m68k and SPARC.

    This comprehensive architecture support ensures maximum infection potential across diverse embedded systems and enterprise servers.

    The command-and-control infrastructure operates on compromised residential IP addresses distributed across multiple ASNs, providing resilience and evasion capabilities that make traditional blocking strategies less effective.

    Technical Infrastructure and Obfuscation Mechanisms

    The dropper script employed by RondoDox v2 showcases sophisticated evasion and persistence techniques designed to bypass security controls and eliminate competing malware.

    Upon execution, the script immediately disables SELinux and AppArmor security frameworks using commands such as setenforce 0 and service apparmor stop, creating an environment conducive to malicious activity.

    The script then proceeds with aggressive competitor elimination, systematically killing processes associated with cryptocurrency miners like xmrig and other known botnet families including redtail.

    This behavior ensures resource monopolization on infected systems while reducing detection probability by eliminating noisy competing malware.

    The binary payload itself employs XOR-based string obfuscation with a key value of 0x21 to conceal critical configuration data from static analysis tools.

    Decoded strings reveal command-and-control protocol implementations including “handshake” for C2 initialization and “udpraw” indicating DDoS capabilities.

    The malware demonstrates anti-analysis awareness by checking for exit code 137, which indicates SIGKILL termination commonly employed by automated sandbox environments.

    Detection of this condition causes immediate script termination, effectively evading many automated malware analysis systems.

    #!/bin/sh
    # bang2013@atomicmail.io
    exec > /dev/null 2>&1
    [ -t 0 ] && exit 0
    for p in /proc/[0-9]*; do pid=${p##*/}; [ ! -e "$p/exe" ] && kill -9 $pid 2>/dev/null; done
    setenforce 0
    service apparmor stop
    mount -o remount,rw /||sudo mount -o remount,rw /
    Attak execution (Source – Beelzebub)

    Persistence mechanisms leverage cron-based scheduling with @reboot directives, ensuring automatic execution following system restarts.

    The malware attempts installation across multiple filesystem locations including /tmp/lib/rondo, /dev/shm/lib/rondo, and /var/tmp/lib/rondo, demonstrating awareness of different system configurations and permission structures.

    Network communication occurs over TCP port 345 using a custom binary protocol that initiates with a “handshake” message to the primary C2 server at 74.194.191.52.

    The malware spoofs User-Agent strings to appear as legitimate iPhone iOS 18.5 devices, further obscuring malicious traffic within enterprise environments.

    DDoS capabilities include HTTP flood attacks mimicking gaming traffic, UDP raw socket operations, TCP SYN flooding, and protocol mimicry for OpenVPN, WireGuard, and popular gaming platforms including Minecraft, Fortnite, and Discord.

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    The post RondoDox Botnet Updated Their Arsenal with 650% More Exploits Targeting Enterprises appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • A bipartisan group of lawmakers said on Tuesday they have made slight progress toward ending the government shutdown, which is poised to become the longest in U.S. history after another failed vote will drag it into its 36th day. 

    Senators are getting closer to an agreement on a package of full-year appropriations bills for certain agencies and an accompanying stopgap bill to reopen the rest of government until a to-be-determined date. Lawmakers in both parties suggested many details still needed to be ironed out and there was not yet any broad agreement, but suggested the two sides were having ongoing conversations that have proven productive. 

    Sen. Gary Peters, D-Mich., declined to discuss the nature of the negotiations, saying only that they are in a pivotal moment. 

    “I don't want to characterize conversations,” Peters said. “We're in a sensitive time right now. It's important to say we're still talking and hopefully progress will be made.” 

    In a note of barely perceptible optimism, Sen. Mark Kelly, D-Ariz., said the Senate has inched closer to a resolution. 

    “Maybe we're moving.” Kelly said. “We're closer to the end of this than we are to the beginning.”

    Sen. Susan Collins, R-Maine, said progress has been made in those conversations. 

    “The talks are more productive,” Collins said. “It's still a challenge, and there are issues to be solved.” 

    The senators are considering three full-year appropriations bills—to fund the Veterans Affairs Department, the Agriculture Department and the legislative branch—marking one-fourth of the twelve spending bills Congress must pass each year. The Senate approved a package earlier this year, but negotiators are working on a version that could clear the House and, potentially, be attached to a continuing resolution to temporarily fund the rest of government. 

    Republican senators noted that issues on the three-bill “minibus” have mostly been ironed out, though details remained under wraps. The Senate and House have passed vastly different fiscal 2026 appropriations bills, with the latter measures introducing significant cuts that the upper chamber largely avoided in its bipartisan legislative proposals. 

    Senate Democrats held a lengthy, two-plus hour meeting Tuesday afternoon, though they did not announce any strategy once it concluded. 

    “We had a very good caucus, and we're exploring all the options,” Senate Minority Leader Chuck Schumer, D-N.Y., told reporters after the lunch.Peters said after the meeting that conversations on how to end the shutdown were “still a work in progress,” adding the meeting was so long because “there was a lot to discuss.” 

    While the Senate rejected the House-backed continuing resolution that would fund agencies through Nov. 21 for the 14th time on Tuesday, it appears the legislation is no longer operative. Senate Majority Leader John Thune, D-S.D., said a new CR—for agencies not otherwise funded by full-year spending bills, should such a deal come together—with a later expiration has become necessary. 

    “The Nov. 21 deadline no longer makes a lot of sense, so clearly it would need to be extended,” Thune said. He added the new deadline was still being discussed but the goal was to avoid another year-long CR.

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  • HONOLULU—Nine months into the second Trump administration, an acting defense secretary from President Trump’s first term said he thought “we’d be a lot further along” toward a nimbler military.

    “I’m seeing a lot of marketing coming out of the department, and not a lot of outcomes,” Chris Miller said during a panel at the AFCEA TechNet Indo-Pacific conference last week. 

    Miller, who served as acting defense secretary from November 2020 to January 2021, said today’s Pentagon leaders are taking “an approach where if you have experience inside the Beltway, somehow you’re suspect and not worthy. And what I’m seeing are a bunch of like, quote-unquote brilliant business people that do not understand the plumbing of the most bureaucratic, Byzantine organization, probably since [the] Byzantine [Empire], and we’re losing opportunities because there’s a lack of focus.” 

    Amid a shift in national security strategies from the Indo-Pacific to the southern border, the former Special Forces colonel also criticized the push to focus on one adversary or challenge at a time. “Where’s the leadership? We spend a trillion dollars a year on national security. We can do more than one thing.”

    Miller offered his comments during a discussion on ubiquitous digital surveillance in the region, where Sean Berg, a former deputy commander of Special Operations Command Pacific, said China “is already in phase three of that war: dominate” while “we still think of ourselves in phase zero: shaping.” 

    But when quantum decryption becomes practical, Berg said, China will be able to read untold oceans of once-secure messages that it has intercepted and filed away, then use them to gain unprecedented understanding of the patterns of U.S. forces. 

    “Whoever gets quantum first and is able to use that metadata to go back and figure out and predict every single move that the U.S. is about to make, whether it's an air crew landing and going to the same hotel, whether it is the fleet gearing up, and all the Copenhagen being bought out from 7-Eleven from a Ranger battalion,” he said.

    The challenge of open data and ubiquitous surveillance is particularly relevant in the Pacific, where Rob Christian, the former command chief warrant officer for 311th Signal Command, pointed out that China “is the largest technically advanced enemy we’ve ever seen and could imagine, and they also own the majority of the infrastructure.”

    Twenty years ago, operators could use burner phones, get local SIM cards, or even turn phones off to “hide in the noise.” But “hiding in the noise now is much more difficult when you think about the layer of AI and analytics on top of things that are out there and all the stuff we’ve dumped out there through our travels,” Christian said. “I think the challenge is slowly kind of morphing into, ‘OK, you’ve got to project, but you’ve also got to protect’.” 

    Panel moderator Mike Stokes, vice president of strategic engagements and marketing for Ridgeline, called the issue one of “digital signature warfare.” 

    “It’s almost its own domain, where we need to think about the adversary’s capabilities to collect on us and our ability to counter those threats as its own doctrine and policy,” Stokes said. 

    Berg said that one problem is that success looks like nothing is happening. Even if the U.S. government funded an identity-management campaign “that had all of the both offensive and defensive capabilities that would be integral in the technical surveillance to both protect and then understand how we’re being surveilled, the metric that would come out of that is nothing. Nothing would happen. Adversaries would not violate people’s sovereignty. There would be no crossing the border. There would be no economic coercion that would happen. There would be no bilateral manipulation of currency happening. And when you are fighting for dollars, telling the HASC or the SASC or the Appropriations Committee, ‘Yes, for the $1.3 billion, how much nothing would you like, Madam Senator?’ It’s a terrible argument to make.” 

    Additionally, the “bread and butter” of special operations is working with partner nations, and in every exercise, “you go into the [Joint Operations Center], you throw up your slides, and the first thing all the partners do is this,” he said, holding his phone up high above his head and pretending to take photos of the listening audience. “They start taking pictures of the slides and then sending them over Line or WhatsApp. That’s the end-to-end encryption on a Huawei backbone… The entire digital infrastructure and economic backbone of this entire theater is owned by the PRC.” 

    So what can commanders do? Christian suggested they “train and try…and then let yourself be exposed and fail forward, because that’s the only way your troops are gonna learn.” 

    Miller’s advice to commanders: “Stop saying you don't have any money. That's complete bull,” he said. “I do believe operational commanders should have a lot more money to work through their things, but…please, I'm begging commanders to stop saying that.” And, he said, meet with companies that may have solutions to their problems. 

    “Right now, all we’re trying to do is fight World War II in the Pacific. That’s exactly our operational concept,” Miller said. “There are pockets of brilliance, kids that get it, but you know, we’re still fundamentally organized to refight the Cold War, which really was refighting World War II in the Pacific. So…we’re fighting an uphill battle on that.”

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  • A sophisticated remote access trojan named SleepyDuck has infiltrated the Open VSX IDE extension marketplace, targeting developers using code editors like Cursor and Windsurf.

    The malware disguised itself as a legitimate Solidity extension under the identifier juan-bianco.solidity-vlang, exploiting name squatting techniques to deceive unsuspecting users.

    Initially published on October 31st as version 0.0.7, the extension appeared harmless until it was maliciously updated to version 0.0.8 on November 1st, gaining new capabilities after accumulating 14,000 downloads.

    The extension masquerades as a development tool for Solidity programming, a language commonly used in blockchain and smart contract development.

    Attackers leveraged this popular category to maximize their victim pool among cryptocurrency developers and blockchain engineers.

    What makes this threat particularly dangerous is its ability to establish persistent remote access to infected Windows systems while maintaining stealth through various evasion techniques.

    Secure Annex analysts identified the malware’s unique persistence mechanism that utilizes Ethereum blockchain contracts to maintain command and control infrastructure.

    This innovative approach allows attackers to update their control server addresses even if the primary domain is seized or taken offline.

    Solidity extension (Source – Secure Annex)

    The malware communicates with sleepyduck[.]xyz as its default command and control server, employing a 30-second polling interval to receive instructions from threat actors.

    Sleepyduck instance (Source – Secure Annex)

    The infection begins when the extension activates upon opening a new code editor window or selecting a .sol file.

    The malware retrieves critical machine information including hostname, username, MAC address, and timezone data, which helps it evade sandbox analysis environments commonly used by security researchers.

    Ethereum-Powered Persistence Mechanism

    SleepyDuck demonstrates advanced persistence through blockchain technology, representing a concerning evolution in malware infrastructure.

    The threat maintains resilience by storing fallback configuration data in Ethereum contract address 0xDAfb81732db454DA238e9cFC9A9Fe5fb8e34c465.

    When connectivity to the primary command server fails, the malware queries this immutable blockchain contract to retrieve updated server addresses, polling intervals, and even emergency commands for all infected endpoints.

    The malware’s activation function creates a lock file to ensure single execution, then invokes a deceptive webpack.init() function that initializes the malicious payload.

    During initialization, it identifies the fastest Ethereum RPC provider from a hardcoded list, establishes a command execution sandbox through vm.createContext(sandbox), and begins its polling loop to await attacker instructions.

    This architecture grants attackers complete remote control over compromised systems while maintaining operational security through decentralized infrastructure that cannot be easily dismantled.

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    The post New ‘SleepyDuck’ Malware in Open VSX Marketplace Allow Attackers to Control Windows Systems Remotely appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • Congress’s simmering discontent with the Pentagon’s recent decision-making and lack of transparency with its lawfully-mandated oversight body boiled over during a routine nomination hearing Tuesday, one of the few venues lawmakers have had to get answers from defense officials since the second Trump administration began in January. 

    Austin Dahmer was ostensibly before the committee to answer questions about how he would tackle the job of assistant secretary for strategy, plans, and forces—a job whose title and responsibilities have changed in ways that the committee was only told about on  Sunday night, Sen. Roger Wicker, R-Miss., the committee chairman, said during the hearing.  

    But because Dahmer has already been performing the duties of another high-level Pentagon official—and because Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth has restricted communication between the department and Congress, requiring every interaction be cleared through legislative affairs—a bipartisan group of senators took the opportunity to grill him on a host of recent department moves, some of which they contend are in direct opposition to President Trump’s stated foreign-policy positions. 

    Sen. Tom Cotton, R-Ark, listed several: the pause in Ukrainian security assistance, the uncoordinated review of the AUKUS agreement, opposition to deploying more U.S. troops to the Middle East during the Iran-Israel war in June, the cancellation of a meeting among top Japanese and U.S. officials, and the recent cancellation of a rotational Army brigade deployment to Romania. 

    “I understand that media reports can be wrong, believe me, but it just seems like there's this pigpen-like mess coming out of the policy shop that you don't see from, say, intel and security and acquisition and sustainment,” Cotton said.

    Asked why the policy undersecretary’s office, led by Elbridge Colby, has been at the center of so many controversies, Dahmer blamed “fake news” and “inaccurate reporting” while claiming ignorance of details.

    “This decision did not appear to reflect the policy mandate of President Trump,” Wicker said of the withdrawal of troops from Romania. “Just two weeks ago, the president had said that troops would not be withdrawn from Europe. It is unclear to me how the move fits with the commander-in-chief's direction.”

    Asked why the decision hadn’t been coordinated with Congress, Dahmer claimed the committee had received three briefings on the move. During the hearing, Wicker confirmed with committee staff that no such briefings had occurred.

    “Are we confusing ‘notifications’ with ‘briefing’? Check on that; will you do that?” he told Dahmer.

    Dahmer claimed that both Romanian and NATO officials had been briefed on the decision, but couldn’t name any of the officials or when the discussions took place.

    Wicker said there has been a distinct lack of coordination between the Pentagon and Congress, in contrast with the first Trump administration.

    “Members and staff of this committee have struggled to receive information from the policy office and have not been able to consult in a meaningful way with the shop, either on the National Defense Strategy or the Global Posture Review,” he said.

    The policy office is “the worst in the administration,” Sen. Dan Sullivan, R-Alaska, said, in that it is harder to get in contact with than Hegseth or the president himself. 

    “Man, I can’t even get a response,” Sullivan said. ”And we’re on your team!”

    Sullivan admonished Dahmer and his office for not coordinating with the committee on the National Defense Strategy, a document that only exists because Congress mandated it in law.

    “Where do you think the requirement from the NDS comes from? Yeah, it comes from us,” he said. “Don’t you think it would be smart to maybe preview it?”

    And in some cases, Wicker pointed out, it appears the policy shop hasn’t coordinated with the White House, as shown by President Trump’s surprise upon learning that the administration had paused security assistance to Ukraine in July.

    Dahmer claimed that there had been no such pause, despite a Pentagon spokesman confirming one on July 2. 

    “My impression today is you cloaked your testimony in a veil of ignorance. You don't know what's happened in many different cases, when in fact, you were basically the stand-in and the surrogate for Secretary Colby,” Sen. Jack Reed, D-R.I., the committee’s ranking member, told Dahmer. “Again, as the No. 2 in policy, what were you doing?”

    Reed also asked about the change to Dahmer’s own prospective job title. The job has long been called assistant secretary for “Strategy, Plans and Capabilities”; that’s what the department’s website still says, and it’s how the nominee was introduced at his confirmation hearing. But Dahmer responded to pre-hearing questions using the title of assistant secretary for “Strategy, Plans and Forces,” reflecting an Oct. 8 OSD memo ordering up that change and others. 

    Reed said the change was described to him as “cosmetic,” even though it directs a reorganization that moves three deputy assistant secretaries under Dahmer’s prospective office.

    “Normally, when the department conducts such a reorganization, it will send to the committee a summary of those changes for our review and consideration before the committee proceeds with the nomination,” Reed said. “This is important because the Senate has a constitutional duty to advise and consent on all Senate conferred nominees. As such, having a basic understanding of a nominee's duties is imperative to our oversight role. Unfortunately, that did not happen in this case.”

    Dahmer said he took responsibility for the late notification and lack of consultation with the committee. He said the Pentagon’s office of legislative affairs should have reached out, and it was his responsibility as the policy deputy to make sure that happened.

    Lawmakers have stopped short of levying any threats against the department, though as Sen. Tim Kaine, D-Va., pointed out, they have made clear the unseriousness with which they regard the current chain of command in one regard: neither the House nor the Senate version of the draft National Defense Authorization acts include a statutory change of the Defense Department’s name to the War Department, despite the administration’s insistence on using what amounts to an official nickname without congressional approval. 

    “As far as I'm concerned, there's no effort for Congress to make the name change. The president did this by executive order, but acknowledged it would take a congressional authorization, and it was an alternate name,” Kaine said. “I view it as a form of political cosplay. Cosplay isn't my thing, but to each his own.”

    It’s not clear whether the senators’ ire for the Pentagon’s policy shop will upend Dahmer’s chances at confirmation. A spokesman for Wicker did not respond to a query from Defense One about whether the senator intended to vote in the affirmative. 

    “Mr. Dahmer, you're clearly avoiding answers to questions that you should have been acutely aware of in your position,” Reed said. “That does not bode very well for your future role in the Department of Defense, since it's essential that this committee has accurate and specific knowledge, and I think you've essentially indicated to us that you won't cooperate with us.”

    If he doesn’t get the votes, he would be the only the second of several controversial Trump defense nominees to face real opposition to confirmation, after Hegseth’s vote required a tie-breaker from Vice President JD Vance.

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  • The nascent collective that combines three prominent cybercrime groups, Scattered Spider, LAPSUS$, and ShinyHunters, has created no less than 16 Telegram channels since August 8, 2025. “Since its debut, the group’s Telegram channels have been removed and recreated at least 16 times under varying iterations of the original name – a recurring cycle reflecting platform moderation and the operators’

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  • A critical remote code execution (RCE) vulnerability tracked as CVE-2025-11953 in the @react-native-community/cli NPM package.

    With nearly 2 million weekly downloads, this package powers the command-line interface for React Native, a JavaScript framework beloved by developers building cross-platform mobile apps.

    The vulnerability, scored at CVSS 9.8 for its network accessibility, low complexity, and potential for high-impact damage, lets unauthenticated attackers execute arbitrary operating system commands on a developer’s machine via the package’s development server.

    React Native’s CLI, extracted from the core codebase years ago for better maintainability, handles essential tasks like initializing projects and running the Metro bundler.

    Commands such as “npm start” or “npx react-native run-android” launch this server, which bundles JavaScript for emulators or devices.

    But JFrog researchers found that the server’s /open-url endpoint mishandles user input, passing it directly to the “open” NPM library’s unsafe open() function.

    On Windows, this spawns shell commands with full parameter control, think launching calc.exe or writing files like a proof-of-concept “pwned.txt.” On macOS and Linux, execution is more limited but could escalate with further tweaks to URI schemes or file handlers.

    What elevates this from a local nuisance to a nightmare is a secondary issue in React Native’s core: the Metro server binds to all network interfaces (0.0.0.0) by default, despite console messages claiming localhost-only access.

    This stems from an undefined host parameter in the runServer function, exposing endpoints to remote attackers. Developers using vulnerable CLI versions (4.8.0 to 20.0.0-alpha.2) in the @react-native-community/cli-server-api package are at risk, especially those skipping frameworks like Expo, which use alternative servers.

    Not everyone faces the same level of risk. Projects that use Metro for hot reloading during development, often seen in basic React Native setups for Windows, macOS, iOS, or Android, often take on more challenges.

    Global installations or bundled dependencies amplify the threat. JFrog demonstrated Windows exploits easily, while Unix-like systems demand creative workarounds, such as exploiting URI handlers for remote file execution.

    The fix arrived swiftly, thanks to Meta’s security team, in CLI version 20.0.0. Developers should update via npm in project folders or globally, then verify with “npm list @react-native-community/cli-server-api.”

    For immediate protection, bind the server to localhost: “npx react-native start –host 127.0.0.1.” This vulnerability underscores the perils of third-party sinks like the “open” package and default network exposures in dev tools.

    Follow us on Google News, LinkedIn, and X for daily cybersecurity updates. Contact us to feature your stories.

    The post Critical RCE Vulnerability in Popular React Native NPM Package Exposes Developers to Attacks appeared first on Cyber Security News.

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  • Coming soon: Defense Secretary Pete Hegseth’s acquisition reform. Three days before his scheduled address to defense CEOs and acquisition officials, Valerie Insinna of Breaking Defense obtained what she says is a six-page draft memo laying out “sweeping changes to the way [the U.S. military] buys weapons and platforms.” However, since the memo was still in draft form, “It is unknown if Hegseth intends to announce these changes from the stage,” Insinna reported Tuesday morning. 

    Among the changes: Hegseth wants to rename the “defense acquisition system” to the “warfighting acquisition system,” which is in line with Hegseth’s departmental rebranding strategy that congress (as required by law) has not approved or formalized. 

    According to the memo, “Speed to capability delivery is now our organizing principle: the decisive factor in maintaining deterrence and warfighting advantage.” To that end, Hegseth is seeking “fewer internal review processes and new incentives both for DoD officials and industry,” Insinna writes. 

    Hegseth: “The core principle of this transformation is simple: place accountable decision makers as close as possible to program execution, eliminate non value added layers of bureaucracy, and prioritize flexible trades and timely delivery at the speed of relevance,” the memo reads. 

    Expert reax: With these new plans, Hegseth is effectively saying, “I want to prioritize speed,” Todd Harrison of the American Enterprise Institute told BD. “What he’s not saying is, ‘I’m willing to accept higher costs and lower performance.’ But that is the reality, that when you prioritize one, you’re making sacrifices in one or both of the others,” said Harrison. Continue reading, here.

    ICYMI: Hegseth’s past and future acquisition changes, rolled up by Breaking Defense, here

    General Atomics has flown a second collaborative combat aircraft, according to new images released by the company on Thursday. 

    Photos show two of the company's YFQ-42A collaborative combat aircraft sitting on a runway. Another image shows one of the drone wingmen in the sky, with a different tail number than the drone wingman that took flight back in August. The reveal comes days after neoprime contractor Anduril announced it had notched its first flight, which was delayed amid software issues to make the test semi-autonomous. Both companies are competing in the Air Force's CCA competition.

    General Atomics' first CCA flight this summer was not semi-autonomous. When asked by Defense One when General Atomics would reach that milestone, C. Mark Brinkley, a company spokesman, said “I can’t speak to the timelines on our flight tests on YFQ-42A, but this software isn’t holding us back” pointing to more than 300,000 push-button takeoffs and landings with no Class A mishaps across its fleet. “It’s like asking Michael Jordan if he can dunk,” Brinkley said. “We can dunk.” 

    Related reading:Rheinmetall closing in on multi-billion-euro ammunitions contract, CEO tells Reuters,” Reuters reported Tuesday from Berlin


    Welcome to this Tuesday edition of The D Brief, a newsletter dedicated to developments affecting the future of U.S. national security, brought to you by Ben Watson, Tom Novelly, and Bradley Peniston. It’s more important than ever to stay informed, so thank you for reading. Share your tips and feedback here. And if you’re not already subscribed, you can do that here. On this day in 1979, the Iran hostage crisis began. 

    Around the Defense Department

    When it comes to resuming U.S. nuclear weapons tests, President Trump and his energy secretary are of different minds, the New York Times reported Monday after interviews with both officials aired on TV in the past 48 hours. 

    Recap: Trump announced his order to resume nuclear testing “immediately” last Wednesday. It was initially unclear if he was referring to tests of nuclear-weapons delivery systems—like ballistic missiles, e.g., or actual nuclear detonations. But he seemed to clear that up when he told CBS News in an interview that other nations “test way under—underground where people don't know exactly what's happening with the test. You feel a little bit of a vibration. They test and we don't test. We have to test. And Russia did make—a little bit of a threat the other day when they said they were gonna do certain forms of a different level of testing. But Russia tests, China– and China does test, and we're gonna test also.” 

    As we noted last week, Russia and China haven’t detonated nuclear weapons at all this century. Russia did it last in 1990, when it was the Soviet Union at the time; and China last tested weapons in 1996. France tested a nuclear weapon in 1996 as well. India and Pakistan conducted two tests each in 1998. And North Korea tested weapons in 2006, 2009, 2013, twice in 2016, and again in 2017. The Pentagon last detonated a nuclear weapon in 1992. 

    Trump told CBS, “Doesn't it sorta make sense? You know, you make—you make nuclear weapons, and then you don't test. How are you gonna do that? How are you gonna know if they work?”

    However, Trump’s Energy Secretary Chris Wright told Fox on Sunday, “These will be non-nuclear explosions. These are just developing sophisticated systems so that our replacement nuclear weapons are even better than the ones they were before.”

    So, what gives? David Sanger and Zolan Kanno-Youngs of the Times write, “Trump may have been referring to an ongoing, if still classified, argument within the intelligence agencies and national laboratories about whether China and Russia have conducted what amount to small tests…[But] The evidence is vague, and experts disagree on the quality of the evidence.”

    Expert reax: “It makes everyone afraid when the guy in charge of America’s nuclear weapons doesn’t appear to know what he’s talking about,” Matthew Bunn, a Harvard professor focusing on nuclear weapons, told the Times. Read the rest (gift link), here

    Brief analysis: Trump's threat to attack Nigeria this weekend amounts to “whiplash” for recent Pentagon priorities, Reuters reported Monday. “Pentagon officials broadly expected Trump's administration would prioritize border security, China's growing military might and pressuring NATO allies to do more to stand up to Russia. But Trump's announcements in the past week on everything from nuclear testing to Nigeria have caught many off guard by appearing to reshuffle Pentagon priorities,” a trio of reporters write. 

    Regarding possible U.S. strikes inside Nigeria, one U.S. military official told Reuters, “I think we are all learning about this at the same time.” More, here

    Additional reading: 

    Etc.

    U.S. pitches UN on two-year mandate for Gaza security force. On Monday, officials sent a draft memo to several UN Security Council members proposing to send an international force into Gaza for at least two years, Axios reported Tuesday. 

    Breaking: Israel shelled Gaza City on Tuesday, an apparent violation of the ceasefire, Al Jazeera reported.

    Ukraine revamps military service to attract recruits. New York Times: “Until now, Ukrainian soldiers have served under open-ended contracts, leaving them with no control over their future. Enthusiasm for enlistment has waned, with Ukrainians fearful that indefinite duty amounts to a one-way ticket to the front line. Under the new system, both current service members and recruits will be able to sign fixed-term contracts lasting one to five years, Defense Minister Denys Shmyhal said Monday night as he announced the plan.” Read about that and other changes, here.

    Someone else is building fake islands in the South China Sea: Vietnam. The southeast-Asian country has piled dirt, sand, and concrete on nearly two dozen rocks and other features in a bid to forestall Chinese dominance of the strategic waterway, the Wall Street Journal reports. “Satellite images show that Vietnam has created new land on all 21 rocks and so-called low-tide elevations—reefs that were previously submerged at high tide—that it occupies in the Spratlys. That compares with China’s seven such artificial islands in the archipelago.”

    Citing CSIS’s Island Tracker site, WSJ writes: “As of March, Vietnam had built more than 2,200 acres of artificial land in the South China Sea, compared with just under 4,000 acres constructed by China.” Read on, here.

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